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ABSTRACT
The issue of intergenerational equity in the use of natural
resources is discussed in the context of coal mining conversion. More
precisely, the authors attempt to determine if there is a clear—cut
benefit to future generations in setting minimum coal extraction
efficiency standards in mining. it is demonstrated that preserving
fossil fuels beyond the economically efficient level is not
necessarily beneficial to future generations even in terms of their
own preferences. Setting fossil fuel conservation targets for
intermediate products (i.e. energy) may increase the quantities of
fossil fuels available to future generations and hence lower the
costs, but there may be serious disadvantages to future generations as
well. For example, the use of relatively inexpensive fossil fuels in
this generation may result in more infrastructure development and more
knowledge production available to future generations. The value of
fossil fuels versus these other endowments in the future depends on
many factors which we cannot possibly evaluate today. Thus, since we
have no idea of whether we are helping or harming future generations,
the authors recommend that intergenerational equity not be used as a
factor in setting coal mine extraction efficiency standards, or in
establishing requirements.
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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
An important consequence of the increased national awareness
regarding energy scarcity is that the public is questioning whether
the current usage rate of non-renewable energy sources is socially
desirable. This interest is basically attributable to two concerns:
(1) that fossil fuels are environmentally damaging, and (2) that using
non-renewable energy sources now, reduces the stock of stored energy
available for future generations. As the subsequent discussion will
illustrate, both these issues are important to whether the actual rate
of fossil energy use is close to the socially desirable rate.
The issue addressed in this paper is whether this country is
pursuing conservation and non-renewable fuels (especially coal), in a
desirable fashion. The impetus for studying this issue arises from a
project the Jet Propulsion Laboratory is performing for the Department
of Energy concerAng the development of Advanced Coal Extraction
Systems.* One dimension of evaluating advanced systems is their
conservation performance. That is, of the total physical stock of
coal resources which are disturbed by an underground mining operation,
what proportion is actually extracted? This consideration is
especially important for mining in leased federal land where
conservation goals are often explicitly included in the lease
agreement.
In addressing this subject, some obvious questions arise. What
is meant by conservation? What is the difference, if any, among the
terms "non-renewable," "exhaustible," or "depletable" as descriptors
of fossil fuels? What value systems (efficiency vs. equity) are
employed in resolving the issue of what is a socially desirable rate
of consumption? Each of these questions has been considered in turn,
with a concluding discussion of how these considerations apply to the
narrower issue of whether coal extraction systems are achieving a
socially desirable level of conservation.
*This work was done for the Fossil Fuel Extraction Division, United
States Department of Energy under Interagency Agreement No.
ET-76-I--01-9036 with the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
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SECTION II
CONSERVATION
The term conservation can be defined in the broadest context as
using lest of a natural resource. Within this framework, however,
there are at least four ways that conservation can take place. Each
of these alternative interpretations is discussed below using simple
supply and demand curve analysis.
In Figure 2-1, an upward shift in the coal supply function from
Sl to S2 arises because of more stringent health and safety
standards in coal extraction. It costs more to produce at any level
of coal output which results in conservation of pQ units of coal.
Another possible cause of an upward shift in the supply curve is a
minimum extraction efficiency standard; i.e., a firm has to extract a
specified percentage of the physical coal stock in order to obtain the
right to mine. The industry supply curve tends to shift upwards if
the constraint is binding in coal fields exploited without the
standard.
Conservation can also occur as the result of a downward shift in
demand (Dl to D 2 ) for coal, as shown in Figure 2-2. Two factors
can contribute to such a downward shift: (1) a technological
improvement of a coal substitute, or (2) newly instituted
environmental controls on coal conversion which increase cost.
Attitude change is still another factor that can lead to a
decrease in demand for coal. Companies concerned about their image
may avoid burning coal even when they are able to meet environmental
standards, if the risk of doing so is an unfavn,:able public attitude.
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Figure 2-1. Type I Conservation: Upward Shift of
Supply Curve for Raw Coal
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Figure 2-2. Type II Conservation: Downward Shift
in Demand for Raw Coal
A third type of conservation occurs when less energy is used
because of a technical change which improves end-use efficiency. It
is assumed that people do not demand gross Btus, but rather units of
work and that energy is a derived demand. Given the premise that
demand is for net energy, the following figures describe what would
happen. Figure 2-3 shows a conversion technology with efficiency
El. If this efficiency is improved to E2, as shown in graph "a",
it has the impact of shifting the supply curve outward from S l to
9 2 , as shown in graph "b". For any given price, the same amount of
gross energy can now provide more net energy at the same price. As
the intersection points of supply and demand indicate in graph "b",
the net energy demanded (NQ) increases from NQ1 and NQ 2 . If these
net energy demands are translated into gross energy demands*, as shown
in graph "c", the equilibrium quantity of gross energy decreases from
GQ 1
 to GQ 2 .** Thus, greater end-use efficiency can generate
conservation of energy feedstocks such as coal.
*The diagrams in Figures 3a and 3c are identical. Thus, one could
determine the gross energy usage implied by the intersection of
supply and demand in Figure 3b by using Figure 3a, but this wculd
have resulted in a more complex diagram and perhaps added confusion.
**An implicit assumption of these diagrammatic results is that the
increase in end-use efficiency is costless although the results hold
under more general conditions.
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Finally, conservation can occur when the government imposes a
limit on production of a natural resource in order to restrict its
consumption. The supply curve shown in Figure 2-4 is the result of a
government-placed limit on Federal coal leasing. The illustration
implies that the constraint is binding; that is, the equilibrium
quantity demanded equals the supply limit. In this case, pQ is
conserved for future use over what the free market would have saved.
Given these four interpretations of conservation, we can view the
issue of intergenerational equity and conservation with a more precise
understanding of the meaning intended.
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SECTION III
RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES
After much consideration, the term "non-renewable energy
source," as used in this paper, was selected over alternatives such as
"depletable" and "exhaustible." The basis for this choice is the
belief that fossil fuels will never be depleted in a physical seise.
Before this point is reached, society will substitute other forms of
energy which become cost effective. Already., the technical means
exist to convert to a society based entirely on renewable energy
sources. However, the cost of this conversion would be much higher
than using fossil fuels and is unnecessary a; this time. It is clear,
however, that the cost of extraction and refik:.:T,:nt of some of the
physical fossil energy stock is higher than the renewable
alternatives; this implies that society will substitute new forms of
energy for fossil fuels before they are exhausted. Thus, in
discussing fossil conservation, the consideration is not one of
leaving a distant generation without a source of energy. In order to
accept the contention that cost distribution among generations is the
essence of this issue, it must be believed that either we have the
knowledge or will have the knowledge to convert to a renewable
society. Many technical documents support the view that the
technology exists today for such a transition.
The problem of allocation arises with respect to fossil fuels
because the earth has been endowed with a stock of stored solar energy
in the form of hydrocarbons (non-renewables), which are considerauLy
less costly than current systems, to collect the flow of solar energy
(renewables). Thus, a key issue implicit in the question of desirable
fossil fuel conservation is how this relatively inexpensive stock of
fossil fuels should be allocated among generations.
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SECTION IV
EQUITY vs EFFICIENCY
Two dimensions of resource allocation which economists find
useful in explaining the salient issues are efficiency and equity
considerations. The former area has been analyzed extensively by
economists and yields operational decision rules for using resources
if certain assumptions prevail (Section IV-A). For example, one must
accept as given the distribution of income and wealth. Equity
considerations deal with the distribution of income and wealth both
across and between different generations of people. Since there is no
scientifically meaningful way to compare the satisfaction levels of
different individuals, economists cannot tell whether one income or
consumption distribution is better than any other.* This is true not
only for different individuals in one time period (what is usually
referred to as "welfare economics") but also for individuals in
different time periods (the intergenerstional issue). Section IV-B
examines the issues concerning intergenerational equity and suggests
that saving fossil fuels may not benefit future generations even in
terms of their own preferences.
A.	 COMMON ASSUMPTIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
To gain a clear picture rf the workings of the market system,
economists usually make several assumptions which simplify the
economic analysis with a minimal distortion of results. While the
length of this list varies, the assumptions generally fall into four
broad categories:
(1) Price-Taker Assumption: This assumes a large number of
relative y mobile buyers and sellers for each product, so
that an individual's actions have little effect on price.
This squeezes "excessive" profits (profits greater than an
entrepreneur could make elsewhere) out of the product
price, and makes price an accurate Teflection of the added
cost and additional benefits inherent in producing the
last unit of each good.
(2) Perfect Information: Each producer in the marketplace has
information on production techniques while consumers have
product price and quality W n oration sufficient to make
optimal choices.**
*For a discussion of the problems of making equity judgments between
individuals or generations sez Appendix A.
**Recent experimental work suggests that as little as 25 percent of
the consumers being well informed in a given market is enough to lead
to competitive results.
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(3) Well-Defined Markets: Markets exist for all commodities;
even thooe which are normally considered undesirable.
This rules out externalities, which are persistent
divergencies between private and social costs. An example
would be a polluting firm which does not consider the
damage inflicted on the surrounding community among its
cnA_ts. Because the firms's costs are lower than the total
social costs (including the pollution) a non-optimal
amount (i.e., too much) of the firms's output is produced.
(4) The Income Distribution and Preference Patterns Remain the
Same: The premise here is that the income pr3file does
of change, either among members of the current population
or at different time periods. This avoids irreversibility
problems which are caused by changing tastes. (For
,example, future generations may decide that they prefer
the scenic waterways that our generation has turned into
electric power producers.)
The first three assumptions are called "efficiency" assumptions;
by assuring the existence of a market, squeezing out undue profits,
and assuming away risk, they guarantee that, with a given distribution
of income and ownership, resources are allocated in the most efficient
manner. By "efficient" economists mean that no one in the society can
be made better off by shifting to some other level of production
without hurting another member of the society.
Of cGurse some people can be made better off at the expense of
others. By re=eving the "given the distribution of income and
ownership" caveat, va are brought to the realm of the fourth, or
"equity", assumptiot:. Instead of making the best use of a given
resource distributiot., as is done under the efficiency considerations,
the equity assumption attempts to find the best resource
distribution. Since it is virtually impossible to compare the
preferences of different individuals in a consistent manner,
economists have had little to say about equity considerations, leaving
a choice among income distribt;tions to voters or legislators.
This distinction between equity and efficiency issues is readily
apparent in the literature on allocation of depletable resources over
time. Economists have had a great deal to say about the three
efficiency criteria. Since non-renewable resource owners have
substantial market power and are subject to many government
regulations (such as favorable tax treatment, production controls, and
import quotas), the assumption of a competitive market is not met.
This creates a misallocation of resources; for example, Sweeny et al.
(Ref. 1), found that the depletion allowance depresses current
resource prices and increases present consumption at the expense of
future users. In other words, in Figure 2-1 the incentives for that
type of conservation are decreased since the supply curve shifts
downward in response to production subsidies, resulting in lower costs
of production and larger quantities supplied and demanded. Also,
given a high degree of risk or uncertainty, resource depletion is
biased toward the present. In effect, a risk premium is added to
required rates of return on these projects, which reduces the value of
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any benefits far into the future. Society as a whole, on the other
hand, would benefit if these decisions were made in terms of the
expected values. From a societal point of view, risk tends to be
neutralized by spreading the risk over the large number of individuals
in society.
Finally, the third efficiency criterion requires that the
existence of externalities (such as pollution) cause a non optimal
amount of the resource (such as oil refining) to be developed. This
is so because the full costs of p.:oduction are not recognized by
either the producer or buyer. If these costs were "internalized" the
supply curve would shift up (as in Figure 2-1) resulting in fewer
resources being consumed.
When there are a large number of residents subject to the
externality with small costs to each, however, organization is
expensive; no collective action is taken and the misallocation often
persists (see Mishan (Ref. 2), for a full exposition of the post-war
literature on externalities).
The .:onclusion which can be drawn from the literature and
economi: theory is that private markets do induce an efficient amount
of conservation if biases are not present. Current policy is moving
toward making the private market for coal efficient. Subsidies in tax
practices such as the depletion allowance have been re raved. In
addition, the social cost of environmental externalitie. are being
internalized to the coal market through regulation. The effect of
both these actions is to shift the supply curve for coal upwards,
which, coupled with an elastic demand* for coal must result in fewer
coal resources being used.+* Therefore, the message of this section
is that we are moving toward a desirable level of conservation based
solely	 efficiency grounds.
The efficiency considerations summarized above have received
much attention in the economic literature. Equity considerations,
especially across time, have been studied much less. The next section
explores some concepts concerning the allocation of natural resources
among different generations.
*As long as the demand for coal is not insensitive to price (demand
curve is not vertical). The magnitude of this sensitivity is open
to question, since large quantities of coal are supplied through
long-term contracts. This suggests that demand may be relatively
inelastic in the short run, because users are tied to long-term
contracts. However, as these contracts come up for renewal, buyers
are probably very price conscious, and demand should have some
elasticity.
**A secondary effect of increasing the cost of coal by internalizing
environmental externalities is that the incentives for greater
end-use efficiency are increased (Figure 2-3).
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B.	 EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS
Using renewable energy sources now will presumably leave a
larger stock of non-renewables for future generations. The issue is
whether that is necessarily "good". A highly pertinent issue is, of
course, "good" for whom? This paper takes the position that it is
impossible to predict that leaving large stocks of non-renewable
energy sources is necessarily better for future generations, even in
terms of their own preferences. The basis for this assertion rests on
two points: (1) that the value of non-renewable energy sources in the
future is a function of the availability and cost of substitutes, and
(2) generations of individuals leave a collection of legacies to
future generations which are not all independent. Implicit throughout
this section on equity is that conservation of type IV (Supply
Constraint) is imposed.
The basis of the first point, concerning the value of "saved"
non-renewable energy sources in the future, is simply that the
possibility exists that they may have little or no value. As long as
technological change is possible (and probable in this case) the
possibility certainly exists that a major technical breakthrough could
occur and significantly reduce the utility of stocks of fossil fuels.
The most obvious example is nuclear fusion, which although a very
t	 remote possibility in the short-run, is hard to discount in the
long-term (beyond 200 years, for instance). Thus, the longer the time
period over which one spreads the use of the stock of stored energy,
the greater the probability that a social loss will occur through
obsolescence of that energy form. Had the Egyptians decided to
conserve blocks of granite for the use of future generations in
building pyramids, the sentiment would have been appreciated, but
there would have been little value in their conservation ethic.
Looking to a similar period in the future, descendents of the present
generation may have a similar response to a legacy of a dirty black
substance called coal; especially if fusion is perfected, if solar
energy is produced cheaply through some new process, or if some other
energy form as yet unknown is developed inexpensively. The outcome
would be socially wasteful, with this generation having been denied
the use of cost-effective resources in order to save them for another,
uncertain time. However, if these technological advances do not
occur, and if that portion of the fossil fuel stock set aside for
future generations is less costly than other energy forms, will
descendents be grateful for the non-renewable energy we save? The
answer to this rhetorical question is "perhaps" which leads to the
second point about non-renewable energy conservation.*
what any generation of people leaves to subsequent generations
is a collection of endowments, of which energy is only one dimension.
To our children and grandchildren we leave an infrastructure from
which they can derive direct benefits and a stock of knowledge upon
which they can build. In the longer-run, the former endowment must be
*Conservation is used here to mean saving resources beyond that implied
by efficient private markets. An example of this type of conservation
is a supply limit as illustrated in Figure 2-4.
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Figure 4-1. Trade-Off of Intergenerational Legacies
replaced, but the latter is of enduring value. The essence of this
argument is that these endowments are not independent, but in fact
have a relationship as depicted in Figure 4-1.
The shaded area (ABCDE) represents the feasible set of legacies
which can be left as of some future date. The set is convex because
each unit increase in the quantity of either endowment is increasingly
expensive in terms of the other. In other words, the first increments
in the stock of knowledge are relatively inexpensive in terms of the
energy resources which are consumed (i.e., in the range between D and
E). A large reduction in energy left for the future occurs between
points C and B, while only a small increase in knowledge occurs. An
intuitive explanation of the link between the production of knowledge
and the use of energy seems fairly evident in the activities of
developed and undeveloped nations. In the United States, for
instance, less than five percent of the population produces more than
enough food for the country's consumption. This efficiency is made
possible by a highly capital intensive farming industry which is
complementary to energy. Given this efficiency in food production,
the remaining 95 percent of the workforce is available for other
pursuits--one of which is basic research. Nations which have not
provided for th!ir fundamental needs do not invest in the basic
research which reads to the expansion of the knowledge base. Thus,
one of the beneficial by-products of the industrialization of the last
century, made possible partly by the availability of inexpensive
energy, has been the diversion of resources to the production of
knowledge. We have been able to move from point E along the frontier
of the feasible set.*
*In reality we are probably somewhere inside the frontier, given the
government policies which have led to inefficient energy use.
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It is impossible to predict the most desirable set of legacies
to leave future generations. Obviously they would like to achieve the
highest level of well-being possible in terms of their own
preferences. More of both knowledge and fossil energgy is better than
leis, thus W3 is a higher level of wel:-being than W Z , which in
turn is better than W (Figure 4-1). The problem is that we have no
idea what their preference ordering (W) will indicate; it is dependent
upon the substitutes for fossil fuel and the quality of knowledge we
leave them. As mentioned earlier, in the extreme case where very
inexpensive energy (e.g., fusion) is obtained, the highest preference
ordering (W) will intersect the feasible region at point A, indicating
that as much knowledge as possible, together with little fossil fuels,
is the best combination of legacies (Figure 4-2a). Of course,
preferences which indicate the other extreme (points near E) are also
possible.
In the latter case, fossil energy is extremely valuable. It
s takes large increases in the stock of knowledge (b) to compensate for
even small reductions in the stock of fossil fuels. Would we, for
instance, be happy to pay double the real cost of energy we pay now if
earlier generations had also left us a cure for cancer? The tie
between the use of energy and research is a loose one--very little
energy is consumed directly in the conduct of basic research.
Nevertheless, the industrialization of the west has freed major human
resources to pursue activities which are not tied directly to
subsistence.
The essence of the arguments presented is that the concept of
replacing non-renewable energy resources with renewable ones is not
necessarily socially valuable even to the future generations it is
supposed to benefit. Fossil energy has no intrinsic value; it is an
intermediate product which provides a service. Thus, the cost of
substitutes is crucial to the question of equity to future generations.
o.	 b.
UNUSED FOSSIL	 UNUSED FOSSIL
ENERGY	 ENERGY
Figure 4-2. Intergenerational Legacies
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There appears to be some consensus within the scientific community
that renewable energy resources will be demonstrated to be able to
provide virtually all of the United States' fossil-derived energy at a
cost which is perhaps two-to-three times the projected cost of the
fossil alternatives in the 2000 time period. Of course, some
advocates are much more optimistic than this would indicate, and in
some applications (e.g., water heating in the Southwest) they are
probably justified. But even if the real cost is a factor of three
more expensive in the long run, is it inhumane to expect future
generations to deal with the problem themselves? Probably not. As
previously mentioned, technological advance has the potential to
greatly soften the impact of this cost increase on the quality of
life. Furthermore, the "fairness" problems associated with
conservation are bilateral. A reasonable question to ask is whether
or not the current generation should be expectec: to forego some of its
income by using more expensive renewable energy resources. Such an
effort may save fossil fuels, but these resource savings miy not even
be valuable to posterity.
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SECTION V
INTERCENERATIONAL EQUITY AND COAL CONSERVATION
Applying the preceding discussion to the specific issue of
extraction efficiency in underground coal mining does not indicate a
clear course of action. There is still the problem of separating
efficiency and equity issues. Nevertheless, there are useful
observations and possible studies which would help lead to the
socially desirable solution.
One interesting question is whether there is an intergenera-
tional equity rationale for setting a minimum extraction efficiency
level on mining done on federally-owned land. The specific case of
interest is where private coal companies use technologies such as room
and pillar mining where extraction efficiencies are low (e.g., 50
percent) compared to advanced techniques. This choice of technologies
is assumed to be rational in that the profit-maximizing technology and
extraction efficiency are utilized in response to given mining and
market conditions.*
Precedents do exist for federal actions on intergenerational
equity grounds. For example, much of the debate on nuclear waste
concerns future generations, and park lands have been set aside in
perpetuity for future enjoyment. However, there is the problem
discussed earlier of whether future generations would benefit, in
terms of their own preferences, if they were endowed with cheaper
energy at the expense of infrastructure and knowledge.
Because of this uncertainty about the energy-knowledge
combinations, it appears that posterity would not consider intergen-
erational equity as ample justification for starting research on
conservation of coal. This does not imply that coal conservation
research should not be undertaken. There are many economic efficiency
arguments for coal conservation; the existence of incomplete
information, price regulation, tax incentives, and environmental
externalities all suggest that current coal extraction rates are too
high. Thus a first step would be to look at efficiency conditions in
the coal market. By definition, if the market is not efficiently
organized, some people can be made better off without making anyone
worse off, thus it should be politically easier to enact efficiency
changes. In this context one would want to study the performance and
conduct of the existing industry. For example, the government
currently leases lands to developers at fairly low rates and then
charges them a royalty on each ton of c--1 extracted. This mechanism
has the benefit of reducing risk to th-L. developer by reducing the
investment in land when the resource quality and quantity is not well
known. One negative aspect of this policy, however, is that a
*Paul Thomas, "Evaluation of Conservation Performance in Coal Systems
by a Dynamic Model of Waste," unpublished working paper, JPL,
January 1979.
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fixed cost ( land) has been turned into a variable cost (royalty).
Since profit maximizing firms would extract up to the point where
price equals marginal cost, this tax would lead to a lower extraction
efficiency. Perhaps it would be socially desirable to eliminate the
royalty beyond a certain point to encourage more intensive extraction
of a given mine and provide signals for efficient production at the
margin. The entire property rights issue is quite pertinent in this
context: does the leasing and bidding process provide the proper
incentives for research and implementation of more efficient mining
methods?
A second area worthy of additional research is how coal use (and
hence coal conservation) will be affected by future environmental and
safety regulations. One way to approach this problem is to look at
the trade-offs among the attributes of cost, safety, and environmental
degradation. In order to illustrate the concept with diagrams it will
be assumed that there are only two attributes of interest (cost and
safety). Figure 5-1 shows the trade -off of deaths versus cost as
curve RR'.
The point A is the performance of state of the art conventional
technology for a given type of mine. Incremental changes in this
technology allow us to move along RR' within certain limits; no
decrease in safety can lower cost beyond C and no expenditure on
safety can reduce D below D. Within this range there is a trade-off
where increased safety can be purchased with rising marginal cost,
which accounts for the concavity of RR'.
Given this diagram it is obvious that points within OC*AD* would
be preferred to the current technology represented by point A, since
OC*AD* represents more safety and/or less cost than point A.
Similarly, points above and to the right of XAY are less desirable
than the current technology. A little less obvious is that the entire
area above RR' represents trade-offs of safety and costs which are
inferior to existing technology (and its incremental improvements).
Thus far, we have reduced "advanced" to points beneath the RR' curve,
but it can be bound further.
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Figure 5-1. Cost-Safety Trade-Off
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If one could derive society's indifference curve (locus of
combinations of safety and cost among which scciety is equally
satisfied) it would have the shape of W. As safety is decreased
moving to the right, larger compensations in terms of cost reduction
are required to leave society indifferent, leading to the convex shape
of W. This indifference curve presumably is tangent to RR' (the
locus of technically feasible points) at point A since this is our
current state of technology. If current mining systems are not at
this point, changes could be made in existing technology which improve
societal satisfaction.
Any system in the region CAD is superior to what we have now.
This is not completely intuitive: it suggests that advanced systems
may have higher coats or less safety than is associated with existing
techniques. The region C*AD* represents technologies where there is
an increase in safety, but with no increase in extraction cost.
Alternatively, the section of C*AD* from A to D* implies that no
decrease in safety is justified no matter how large the cost
reduction. Although both these outcomes are possible regulatory
solutions, they may not be optimal from a societal viewpoint. Society
may consider technologies which save many lives at a small incremental
cost to be worthwhile. Thus future technology choices may be selected
from among the possibilities in GEC*A. Similarly, techniques which
drastically reduced extraction costs with minor safety losses
(combinations in DD*A) might also be preferred to point A. Thus, the
entire area below CAD is preferable to point A, even though not all of
these points represent combinations where both costs and deaths are
reduced.
An accurate estimate of CAD would be extremely difficult.
However, a linear approximation is certainly possible. Such an
estimate would improve the understanding of advanced systems and the
safety-cost tradeoffs associated with utilizing them. To empirically
COST	 R($/MMbfu)
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C• -- --- A
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Figure 5-2. Advanced Coal Extraction Systems
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estimate ad one would first need to determine the safety cost
trade-off implicit in other energy systems. Additional constraints
could be obtained from regulations which place limits on safety
performance in energy and other industries. From this activity a
workable definition of "advanced" mining systems could be obtained
which considers trade-offs between cost and safety factors.
A vital piece of information in the evaluation of energy trade-
offs is the cost of energy to future generations. Although we are not
on the verge of resolving this question with any precision, the next
twenty years should give us information which can be used to place
bounds upon the cost of renewable energy sources. If the real cost
(excluding inflation) of utilizing a renewable energy technology is
twice that of fossil fuels, then society's view of conserving fossil
fuels might be quite different than if the real cost were fifty times
as high. We have the capability of waiting this long for more
information without using a major portion of the physical coal
reserve. Acknowledging that both over-conservation and under-
conservation involve cost to society, the danger of acting on limited
information is very high.
In view of these considerations, it is recommended that further
study of conservation for intergenerational equity purposes not be
pursued at this time. This does not mean that further study of
conservation is undesirable. However, justifications for additional
conservation should be based upon efficiency problems (such as price
regulation, tax incentives which favor alternative energy sources,
lack of information upon which to make production decisions, and
externalities imposed upon society by coal production) rather than
equity arguments. Advanced coal extraction systems should therefore
be evaluated on the basis of cost, safety, and environmental
considerations.
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APPENDIX A
THE EQUITY LITERATURE
There have traditionally been two approaches to measuring a
project's value. The most common measure has been Net Present Value
(NPV) where projects are chosen to maximize the stream of benefits,
discounted by an appropriate time rate (so that benefits in different
periods are treated in the same fashion). This criterion has often
been criticized as unfair to future generations on efficiency
groundmi it does not adequately deal with intangible items such as
pain and suffering; imperfect competition and government regulations
cause the benefits stream to be over or under-estimated; the discount
rate used is too high because risk and uncertaint; , is included,
causing present estimates of benefits to be lower than they actually
are; and externalities tip the balance toward present consumption.
However, only a few r.uthors have argued against the NPV criterion on
equity grounds; some authors, such as Baumol (Ref. 1), Solow (Ref. 2),
Arrow (Ref. 3), and Rawls (Ref. 4) have questioned the whole
discounting procedure: Is it really true, as NPV implies, that future
benefits are worth less than current ones?
The second approach to the problem, pioneered by John Ferejohn
and Talbot Page (Refs. 5 and 6) has been callsd the Dominance Rule.
Following the reasoning of Chakravarty :Rai. 7) they assume an
infinite number of generations, since there is no satisfactory way to
determine which generation is the last, and even if a final period is
chosen, the analysis must continue ahead one more period in order to
evaluate the terminal stock. Giver. an infinite time horizon, they
propose four basic conditions that any social choice mechanism must
satisfy ii it is to reflect the preferences of the individuals within
the society:
(1) Transitivity (T)--If project A is preferred to project B
and project B is preferred to C, C cannot be preferred to
A.
(2) Unanimity (U)--If everybody prefers project A to project
B, the social choice mechanism should choose A over B.
(3) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)--The social
preferences about projects A and B depend only on people's
opinions about A and B, and not on their judgments of
other alternatives.
(4) Nondictatorship (N)--Social choices are not controlled by
one individual or one generation.
Haneson (Ref. 8) has shown that with an infinite time horizon
there are an unlimited number of social choice patterns that satisfy
all four conditions. These voting criteria all have the following
("dominance") property; if a finite number of generations prefer A to
B and all other generations prefer B to A then the social choice
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mechanism chooses B over A. In other words, even if a thousand
generations would benefit from a project, it should not be undertaken
if all other generations oppose it.
Page and Ferejohn then compare this Dominance Rule to the net
present value criterion, using a theoretical basis introduced by
Koopmans (Ref. 9). Koopmans found a set of five axioms (see Page and
Ferejohn, pp 10-12 9 for a discussion of these axioms) which allowed
him to derive the mathematical formula for net present value. One of
these is the Stationarity axiom, and it is intuitively interpreted as
followst If in the first time period two programs (A and B) are
identical, but A is preferred to d because of subsequent benefits,
then the social ordering will still rank A preferred to B after the
first period is completed. This axiom plays a very important role in
deriving the present value formula, but it is inconsistent with the
assumptions made in the Dominance Principle. "Inconsistency" means
that the axioms of the Dominance Principle and the Stationarity
assumption cannot hold at the same time; if a social choice criteria
has U, IIA, and Stationarit y then one of the generations (the first)
must dictate what projects ,r-e undertaken.
This result has important implications for intertemporal
equity: if a society makes welfare decisi ,)ns based on "sensible"
criteria (T, U, IIA) then the addition of the Stationarity axiom
(which is a by-product of the discounting rule) requires the first
generation to be a dictator. This is a disturbing conclusion; if
social choice is to be consistent, it cannot be democratic. Using this
result Page and Ferejohn suggest that discounting is unacceptable as a
social choice rule on the grounds of intertemporal equity. They
recommend that a search be started for "broader principles of social
choice" which "incorporate ideas of intertemporal equity", rather than
spending too such time searching for "the" appropriate discount rate
or the "right" measure of costs and benefits.
However, the moral to be drawn from this research may not be as
disturbing as it first appears to be. Some of the conditions for the
Dominance Principles are more restrictive than they seem; these
problems are discussed below.
One unappealing feature is the non-finite planning horizon.
Some projects (disposal of nuclear wastes, greenhouse effects caused
by fossil fuel combustion, ozone depletion, etc.) do have consequences
far into the future; but even the planet this future scenario will
occur on will not remain forever. And once the assumption of a
non-finite time horizon is given up, the Dominance Principle also
becomes dictatorial; all four of its criteria cannot be met by any
social choice mechanism when the planning horizon is less than
infinite.
Another source of criticism is the axioms themselves,
particularly the third one (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives).
Very often the presence of other choices does affect decisions; IIA
does not allow for this, or the possibility that strength of feelings
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may differ among individuals. For example, suppose opinion is split
equally between citizens who believe that a billion dol lars should be
spent on aid to the elderly rather than pollution control, and
citizens who believe the opposite. According to IIA, these two
choices are "tied"; preferences for both programs are the same. But
those who favor aid to the elderly may feel that this is the best
possible use to which the funds can be put, whereas those who favor
pollution control might find other uses of the money (such as public
transportation or cancer research) more desirable. Also, people who
favor aid may feel their alternative is such more desirable than
pollution control, while those who advocate pollution control feel
that it is only slightly better than aid. Given either possibility, a
"reasonable" society might choose to use the money for aid to the
elderly; IIA would view such a choice as irrational.
The Transitivity axiom can also be invalidated; the majority
rule voting mechanism we use in the U.S. can be shown to violate
transitivity in the following examples
Projects
Person lot Choice 2nd Choice 3rd	 Choice
1 A B C
2 B C A
3 C A B
Suppose there are three projects: A. (busing in public schools)
B. (no busing in public schools), and C. (no public schools). One
person prefers "integrated" schools to segregated schools, and any
school to no school. The second prefers "community control": public
schools with no busing are the first choice, and no public schools at
all are preferred to busing. The third person or group voted for
Proposition 13; they prefer no schools at all but might prefer busing
if there were schools. If the vote were between projects A and B, A
would win, because the first :md third voters prefer it; similarly, B
would win over C, and C could -In over A. But this choice pattern is
not transitive; A is preferred to B, B is preferred to C, but C is
preferred to A. Thus a "rational" set of individual preferences can
upset the transitivity assumption.
Another criticism of the
list of choice (C and D are bet
and B) rather than a single chc
10) have replaced IIA with a di
is made; but they still run int
generation dictate preferences.
area in an attempt to find a cc
Dominance Principle is that it gives a
ter than 8 but they are worse than A
ice. Gibbard &%,k' Sstterthwaite (Ref.
fferent axiom, so that a single choice
o the problem of having the first
Much work is still being done in this
insistent choice mechanism.
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So what is left? Page and Ferejohn have shown that NPV is not a
very good choice rule, because it cannot meet a few basic preference
criteria and still incorporate democratic choice procedures. This
paper examined Page and Ferejohn's Dominance Rule criteria and found
that they also contain many flaws. Must we stop using these choice
rules because of the misgivings we have about them, or is there some
middle ground available? What can we say about decisions that must be
made now, which have their effects far into the future?
One possible compromise method of evaluating projects would be a
"Partitioned" approach. The time horizon of a project would be
divided into sections: the first five years, the next five years, the
next twenty years, etc. Within these time segments the worth of a
project would be evaluated by discounting, and woula incorporate our
best estimates of benefits, costs, risks, or changes in technology. As
the time segments drift farther into the future, the weight given any
discounting decreases; this reflects the larger uncertainty we have
about the future's tastes and the technological means by which they
will deal with problems. These project segments would be compared
with the corresponding segments of alternatives. If a project
benefits the current generation, but all the risks and costs are borne
by future generations, this pattern of Rains is made apparent by the
Pa-titioning approach.
This method is an improvement over NPV because it adds some
important additional information--who pays and who benefits. If two
projets result in the same present benefits, they are indistinguish-
able under NPV. However, the Partitioning Rule enables individuals tc
differentiate between projects that benefit most generations to some
extent, and projects that serve the present generation at posterity`s
expense. Under Partitioning, compensation to injured generations
becomes possible; if the greatest costs for a project occur in the
fiftieth through the seventieth years of operation, those generations
which benefit might pro!,de some form of recompense to the generations
that are around in those two decades.
Partitioning also has advantages over the Dominance Principle.
The partitions need not extend into infinity, although an infinite
ime horizon can be used. Partitioning also results in a unique
hoice of projects, rather than a list of possibilities. Finally, the
ethod is understandable and easily used by contemporary decision
skers.
An example of the controversy over intergenerational ,equity
lould be useful here. It is often argued that the development of
uclear energy is more unfair to the future than expandel coal usage,
ecause radioactive waste disposal creates hazards that mcny hundreds
f future generations must face, long after the benefits of increased
nergy production have been enjoyed by their forebears. This reasoning
oes not address several issues, which are discussed below.
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one issue involves "long-term risks": Even if we develop
incredibly safe storage areas for nuclear wastes, who can guarantee
that some natural accident won't occur during the tens of thousands of
years that waste is still dangerously radioactive? Since coal doesn't
have such long-lived effects, why not scrap nuclear power in favor of
coal? This statement fails to note that coal usage also has
"long-term risks"; b+irning massive amounts of coal increases the
amount of carbon dioxide in the air. Scientists are unsure whether
this accumulating C07 will result in "greenhouse effects" that heat
up the environment, or block out additional sunlight so that we are
thrown into another Ice Age. In either case, there are dangers to
increased coal ir4agL; ignoring the long-term risks of coal, while
focusing on those of nuclear technology, is arbitrary and
short-sighted..
Another issue concerns present benefits: Why not leave nuclear
wastes at the reactor site until we have a safe method of waste
disposal? Since the present generation is reaping the gains from
nuclear power, why not give it an incentive to provide safe disposal?
This line of reasoning ignores the increased hazards to all
generations; leaving nuclear wastes near the reactor site not only
increases the possibility of leakage and health hazards, but it also
runs greater risks of theft Pnd terrorism.
Partitioning can address both issues. Underground storage is
preferable to reactor site accumulation because it represents greater
benefits (less theft and leakage) for all generations. Nuclear and
coal usage options may be compared across time to see if one method
benefits only a small number of generations. In addition, the method
includes long-range risks (such as waste disposal and greenhouse
effects) to future generations, at least to the extent that we can
predict them. However, these later benefits or costs are discounted,
because future events grow more uncertain with distance and we c:an.,ot
know for sure what preferences posterity will have or what
technological innovations they will have created to deal with these
problems. The approach has an intuitive appeal; it gives the most
weight ;-o those time periods and issues we have the best grasp of, yet
it also includes a measure of what effects those actions have on
future generations.
In general, economists cannot say as much about equity issues as
they can about efficiency arguments; it is difficult to compare the
preference patterns of different individuals and different
generations. However, a carefully prepared comparison of projects,
using Partitioning Rules, can at least begin to explore the efficiency
and equity considerations in projects which greatly effect the future
and whose decisions must be undertaken now.
f._
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